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*

In one sense, and most generally, one might say that all of these
papers are about, in one way or another, the laws power to produce
certain kinds of identities. One could of course observe that the
identities at stake in the different papers are very different from each
other, shaped as they are by very different historical, political and
social circumstances. However, that would not detract significantly
from the fundamental correctness of grouping these papers under
the rubric of law and identity.
These days, it seems that one cannot turn anywhere within the
legal academy without running into the idea that the law is
fundamentally involved in the production of identities, rather than in
the repression of already existing identities, and that this production
of identities is deeply political. In this mode of understanding the
relationship between law and identity, there is of course a certain
kind of relationship being worked out with the writings of Michel
Foucault, which one associates fundamentally with the idea of
1
productive power.
However, because we are, so to speak, among friends and
because we all agree that the law does in fact have a great deal to do
with the production of identities  I thought it might be more
productive to move beyond that question. Of the many different
points of departure that one could adopt here, I shall choose to focus
*

Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland
State University. B.A., J.D., Harvard University, Ph.D. Candidate, Princeton
University.
1. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE A RCHAEOLOGY OF K NOWLEDGE (A.M.
Sheridan trans., 1985); DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan
Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1978).
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upon the distinction between  law and  politics. This distinction, I
submit, is particularly important in the colonial/postcolonial
situation, and often grievously under-explored.
We all know that  law is political, but I think that something we
need to know more about once again particularly in the
colonial/postcolonial situation is the way in which the discursive
domain of  law developed indeed, continues to develop in
relation to the discursive domain of  politics. In other words, what
made something a  legal question as opposed to a  political
question, and how might the relationship between certain kinds of
 legal  as opposed to  political  activities change our
understanding of colonial history or, today, inform our
understanding of legal practice?
Let me illustrate something of what I mean with an example drawn
from Indian colonial history. First, a somewhat lengthy digression
into the historiography of Indian nationalism and the  womens
question. I draw here upon the work of Partha Chatterjee, who has
written very extensively, and certainly most influentially, about these
2
questions. Chatterjee poses the question of why the  womens
question which so deeply occupied Indian social reformers
throughout the nineteenth century for example, through debates
3
4
over sati, widow remarriage, the Rakhmabai case, the  age of
consent controversy disappeared from public debate towards the
5
end of the nineteenth century. Rejecting the responses of liberal
historians (who interpret the disappearance of such debates as the
occlusion of womens issues by the rise of an atavistic nationalism),
Chatterjee argues instead that Indian/Hindu nationalism located the
 womens question within  an inner domain of sovereignty, far
removed from the arena of political contest with the colonial state
[where] [t]his inner domain of national culture was constituted in
2. See, e.g., PARTHA CHATTERJEE , THE N ATION AND ITS FRAGMENTS: COLONIAL AND
POSTCOLONIAL HISTORIES (1993).
3. See V. Venkatesan, The Law, and the Facts, FRONTLINE , Nov. 27-Dec. 10, 1999
(defining sati under the Commission of Sati (Prevention) Act, 1987, as the  act of
burning or burying alive any widow along with the body of her deceased husband or
any other relative . . . whether the widow voluntarily submits herself to such burning
or burying or is coerced or persuaded into doing so. ), available at
http://www.flonnet.com/fl1625/16250280.htm
4. See Mahesh Vijapurkar, The Doctor Who Opposed Child Marriage, THE HINDU
ONLINE E D. OF INDIAS N ATL N EWSPAPER, July 4, 2001 (providing background on Dr.
Rakhmabai, who was married without her consent when she was ten years old,
became a doctor ten years later, and successfully resisted her husbands demand for
restoration
of
conjugal
rights),
available
at
http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2001/07/04/stories/ 0204000n.htm.
5. See CHATTERJEE , supra note 2, at 116.
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the light of the discovery of tradition . This took place through a
new coding of the familiar distinction between the  world and the
7
 home. I quote at length a very familiar passage from Chatterjees
work:
The material/spiritual dichotomy, to which the terms world and
home corresponded, had acquired . . . a very special significance in
the nationalist mind. The world was where the European power
had challenged the non-European peoples and, by virtue of its
superior material culture, had subjugated them.
But, the
nationalists asserted, it had failed to colonize the inner, essential,
identity of the East, which lay in its distinctive, and superior,
spiritual culture. Here the East was undominated, sovereign,
master of its own fate. For a colonized people, the world was a
distressing constraint, forced upon it by the fact of its material
weakness. It was a place of oppression and daily humiliation, a
place where the norms of the colonizer had perforce to be
accepted. It was also the place, as nationalists were soon to argue,
where the battle would be waged for national independence. The
subjugated must learn the modern sciences and arts of the material
world from the West in order to match their strengths and
ultimately overthrow the colonizer. But in the entire phase of the
national struggle, the crucial need was to protect, preserve, and
strengthen the inner core of the national culture, its spiritual
essence. No encroachments by the colonizer must be allowed in
that inner sanctum. In the world, imitation of and adaptation to
Western norms was a necessity; at home, they were tantamount to
8
annihilation of ones very identity.

As might be expected, the  inner is coded as female, the  outer
as male, so that men are soiled by their necessary negotiation of the
 outer imposed by colonialism and women represent the  inner,
coming thereby to play a very special role in symbolizing, preserving,
and perpetuating the nation. In this regard, Chatterjee points out
that a  new or  enlightened patriarchy comes to define this
woman representing the inner  autonomous domain:
The new woman defined in this way was subjected to a new
patriarchy. In fact, the social order connecting the home and the
world in which nationalists placed the new woman was contrasted
not only with that of modern Western society; it was explicitly
distinguished from the patriarchy of indigenous tradition, the same
tradition that had been put on the dock by colonial interrogators.
Sure enough, nationalism adopted several elements from tradition
6. CHATTERJEE , supra note 2, at 117.
7. CHATTERJEE , supra note 2, at 120-21.
8. CHATTERJEE , supra note 2, at 121.
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as marks of its native cultural identity, but this was now a
 classicized tradition reformed, reconstructed, fortified against
charges of barbarism and irrationality.
The new patriarchy was also sharply distinguished from the
immediate social and cultural condition in which the majority of
the people lived, for the  new woman was quite the reverse of the
 common woman, who was coarse, vulgar, loud, quarrelsome,
devoid of superior moral sense, sexually promiscuous, subjected to
brutal physical oppression by males . . . It was precisely this
degenerate condition of women that nationalism claimed it would
9
reform . . . .

Thus, Chatterjee explains both (i) the disappearance of the
10
 womens question from late Nineteenth century public discourse
and (ii) the passage of the Hindu Code in the post-Independence
period in terms of this nationalist arrogation of claims over
Indian/Hindu women, who were made to inhabit the space of the
sovereign, untainted  tradition that would be removed from
negotiation with the colonial state, on the one hand, and imposed
upon all kinds of women in the post-Independence period, on the
11
other hand.
My object in citing Chatterjees work so extensively is to show how
even the most brilliant historian of Indian nationalism fails to
distinguish adequately between  politics and  law. Chatterjee is
correct to observe that certain kinds of  political issues having to do
with gender reform disappeared from the public arena as nationalist
discourse increasingly made the  womens question one that was
internal to the nation, and hence something that was not up for
negotiation with the colonial state.12 However, what Chatterjee fails
to notice is that certain kinds of  legal issues having to do with
gender reform which wreaked havoc upon the lives of various
subaltern women in Nineteenth century India continued to take
place, and were even enthusiastically applauded within certain kinds
of nationalist discourse. How then is one to explain the coexistence
of (i) the disappearance of frontal assaults upon the Anglo-Hindu
law sati, widow remarriage, the Rakhmabai case, the age of consent
9. CHATTERJEE , supra note 2, at 127.
10. See CHATTERJEE , supra note 2, at 132 (asserting that  female emancipation

disappeared from the public agenda because of the  refusal of nationalism to make
the womens question an issue of political negotiation with the colonial state ).
11. See CHATTERJEE , supra note 2, at 133 (noting that, while after independence it
became legitimate to carry out social reform through marriage rules, property rights,
and equal opportunity, the womens question has once again become a political
issue).
12. CHATTERJEE , supra note 2, at 132.
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issue, and so on from the arena of colonial public debate and (ii)
the judicial  reformist onslaught against various subaltern women
that took place with the approbation of nationalists? Although much
could be said with respect to this question, for my purposes here, this
has much to do with the discursive construction of the domains of
 politics and  law.
This idea is all-too familiar to all Anglo-American legal historians.
For example, the distinction between  politics and law has been
explored productively in the context of capital-labor relations in
Nineteenth century America to explain how explicitly  political
questions relating to the claims of labor were removed from the
arena of  politics, transformed into  legal questions, and displaced
into the arena of  law, where they could be contained within the
13
intricacies of legal doctrine.
However, the historical development of the distinction between
 politics and  law has not been adequately studied in the context
of colonial India, and it can and should be studied. Certain kinds of
highly public  reformist activity surrounding women clearly
occupied the realm of  politics, and therefore disappeared as
nationalist discourse removed the  womens question from the
realm of contestation with the colonial state. Other kinds of
surreptitious judicial  reformist activity surrounding women clearly
occupied the realm of  law, and therefore continued to flourish
even as nationalist discourse claimed Indian/Hindu women for itself.
The fact that nationalist discourse never attempted to save the latter
women from the colonial state, even as it erased such women as
well as its debts to colonial law from national history is telling
insofar as it exposes the way in which the realms of  politics and
 law are constructed in the context of  negotiated independence
in postcolonial India. I will leave out, for reasons of length, the
implication of this understanding for the  personal laws debate in
contemporary India, which is a debate that flares up over and over
again.
My objective in drawing attention to the distinction between the
discursive construction of the domains of  politics and  law is not
to show that oppressive things can be done surreptitiously through
 law when they cannot be done through  politics. Neither is it my
objective to invoke the idea of the  relative autonomy of law.
Neither is it my object to insist upon the difference of law, as if law
like art in Adornos aesthetic theory always exists beyond everything
13. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, L AW, L ABOR ,
A MERICAN R EPUBLIC (1993).

AND IDEOLOGY IN THE
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else, such that all that is left is ones own ferocious insistence on
producing the difference of law (while insisting upon ones Marxist
14
credentials at the same time). In other words, I am not pushing any
particular agenda in suggesting that it might be interesting to explore
the discursive development of  law and  politics. Instead, my aim
is to urge the presenters of the papers to consider how, why and
when  law and  politics separate from each other in the specific
contexts that they explore, and to examine how that separation
 works in the specific contexts of the pasts and presents that they
are interested in because that work urgently needs to be done for the
colonial/postcolonial world. I hope that these brief remarks might
serve as the basis for a discussion of these wonderful papers.

14. See generally THEODOR W. A DORNO, A ESTHETIC THEORY (Gretel Adorno & Rolf
Tiedemann eds., C. Lenhardt trans., Routledge & Kegan Paul 1984).
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